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Abstract
This paper reixrrts on the rusults of an empirical inve,ctigation into the effectiveness of
daily fureign exchange market interventiun by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System in thr U.S. dollar-dwtsche mark market. Conventional channels of influence of interventi-
un and twu channels whi~h take ecwunt of noise treding and chartism are analyzed. In accurdance
with the latter channels, the effect uf interventiun un the level uf the UMIS-rate is found to have
vazied uver time, depending on the strength of the market sentiment. The respective central banks
appear to monitor the volatility uf the DMIS-rate. For two out of four periods we find that
interventions by either uf the central banks were associated with unexpected intradaily DMIS-
vulatility.
wVe are grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland for kindly providing
the daily data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, the latter
unly tu the extent that they aFfected the net foreign position of the Bundesbank, on a confidential
base. We thank en anunymiws rCl'erre fur his comments un an earlier vusiun uf this paper.
Remaining errors are our uwn respunsibility.t
1. Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods tixed exchange rate system in the early
seventies, the exchenge value of the major currencies in the industrialized world is in principle
determined by market forces. However, in the present system of managed floating the ezchange
rate is not the outcome of supply and demand by private market participants only. The monetary
authorities of many countries have tried to influence the relative value of their currencies
i'reyuently hy exchange merket interventions. Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetazy Fund (IMF) as amended in 1978 provides a broad framework for exchange
rate m:magement. Its main ohjective is to prevent competitive devaluations of 1MF-member
wuntrie.ti.
According to the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (1983) the Bundesbank
"(...) has wught trom the onset of tloating to counter disorderly market conditions, dampen
'erratic' short-term exchange rate tluctuations and smooth out excessive swings in the DMIU.S.
dollar rate over longer periods" (p.13). Smith and Madigan (1988) state that "for the period since
March 1973 as a whole (...) it is probably corcect to say that the United States had no ezchange
rate ohjective" (p.188). Obviously, for the large U.S. economy ezchange rate movements are
relatively unimportant in their ultimate repercussions on domestíc growth and intlation. Therefore,
as its maximum tolerable exchange rate changes aze smaller, the Bundesbank will feel the need to
intervene eazlier than the Federel Reserve for given movements of the deutsche mazk-U.S. dollaz
exchange rate. On the other hand, the weight assigned to exchange rate stabilization might be
larger for the Federal Reserve after the Wuvre Accord. While coordinated interventions are
expected to have a larger chance of affecting the development of the exchange rate through their
larger announcement effelt, the Bundesbank will urge the Federal Reserve to do its bit, or the
other way around.
tn this study the effectiveness of official intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve System in the deutsche mark-U.S. dollar spot exchange market will be investiga-
ted empirically. Daily intervention and exchange rate data aze used. The period under considerati-
on runs from the Luuvre Agreement of Fehruary 22, 1987 to October 1989. Attention will be paid
to txxh the etiect uf interventiun un the level and the volatility of daily DMIS-returns. The Report
uf the Working Gruup un Exchange Market lntervention (1983, p.4) detin~ an ofticial interven-
tion as a sale ur purchase uf foreign exchange against domestic currency which monetary
authurities undertake in the exchange market.
The study concentrates on intervention of both central banks in the spor DMI~-exchange
market. Daily observations for the ofticial interventions are used. Focus is on 'active' intervention
which takes place inside the DMIS-exchange market. It is well known that foreign exchange
market participants are eager to detect any information related to official foreign exchange
interventiun. Central bankers, in turn, know that their actions are monitored very carefully.z
Theretixe, it seem~ rea.cunahle tu assume that all interventions undettaken inside the dollarlDM
exchange market are intended to inFluence the price formation on the market. 'Passive' interventi-
on which takr,v place outside the market is left out of cunsideration.
17rc uulliur nf lhr rrmaindrr ul' Ihis papu is as lirlluws. Swliun 11 givcs a cuncisu ruvicw
ut' three cunvemiunal ehannels of influence ot' central hank interventiun. Section Ifl explores to
whal exWm the ncw resc:uch slratugics in the liuld uf exchange rate ~a;unomics have revealud a
different role uf intervention. Section IV reports on the results of an empirical investigation into
the immediate impact of interventions on the level of the DMlS-rate by altering market expectati-
uns. Sume tests are then carried out to determine whether interventions affected unexpected
vulatility in the DMIS-market systematically, in accordance with the chanist channel and the noise
trading signulling chunnel uf intervention. Section V provides a summary of the empirical
tindings, tugether with xrme concluding remarks.
11. Conventional channelc of influence of official intervenlion
Fulluwing the appruach taken hy l.oupesku (1984) and Humpage (1986) a number of
wnventional channels can be distinguished through which the exchange rate can be influenced.
Figure 1 gives a representation uf the three main channels.
~Insert Figure 1 herej
Monet~ry channel
Nun-sterilized purchases and sales of fureign exchange are said w have an impact on the
exchange rate via the monetary channel. A purchase uf foreign currency hy the central bank for
example leads tu a hwsening uf the dumestic muney market anJ, ceteris paribus, results in an
increase in the money stock. In most economic models a depreciation of the currency is the
immediate consequence.
In the monetarist exchange rate mudel for instance, the money demand functions of
wuntries A and B are the hasic compunents. Here they are assumed tu be identical:
A!" - P, ; a~ l', - a, ni, (1)
The relative change in the demand for muney (~) is a function of the relative change in the
price level (~r) and the production level (yr), and the absolute change in the interest rate (~r).
a and a, are the elasticity uf money demand with respect to income and the semi-elastícity of
nwney demand with respect to the interest rate, respectively. If the production level is detetmined
exugenously, if there is perfect capital mubility, and the expectations are formed rationally, and if
it is assumed that purchasing power parity holds for tradeables, the long-term solution for the3
monetarist exchange rate model runs as follows:
S, - (Ma - M~~), - a~(Y~ - Y~J, (2)
An increatie in the money supply in country A leads to a proportional rise in the spot exchange
rate (S ) of currency B in terms uf currency A.
Nearly all empirical investigations disregazd the monetazy channel because it can be argu-
ed that this channel applies to monetary policy rather than exchange rate policy. Of course, tttis
argument may be arbitrary.
Porrjolio halance channe!
To keep the money stock from increasing (decreasing) and, hence, to prevent exchange
rate Ixdicy from interfering with monetary policy, the monetary authorities can sterilize the effect
uf an exchenge market intervention by selling (buying) short-term domestic assets to (from) the
banking system leaving the monetary base of the country unchanged. Theoretically, sterilized
purchases and sales of foreign ezchange can have an impact on the exchange rate. L.oopesko
distinguishes three possihle channels.
In the portfolio-balance model it is assumed that risk-averse wealth holders diversify their
portfolios across assets denominated in different currencies. When wealth holders do not view
otherwise identical governmcnt bonds denominated in currency A and currency B as perfect
suhstitut~, a disturhance ut' the portti~lio-balance caused by a sterilized purchase of currency B
carried uut by the central hank uf country A will, ceteris paribus, increase the value of currency B
in terms of currency A. The level of the risk premium on government bonds denominated in cur-
rency B(RpB) can be defined as:
RP," - (i„ - i~}~-(S,-Er~,.,) (3)
where the notation E~ represents expectation of variable x in period r.l conditioned on
informatiun available in period r. The sale of short-term government bonds denominated in
currency A, necessary to leave the monetary base in country A unchanged, induces a rise inl~
and an uxcuys Jcmand fur t'urcign securitie.c hy thc invcsturs whu try tu rehalance their portfolios.
However, an inducument to switch their a.csets dern~minated in currency A for assets denominated
in curroncy B is royuircxl: a dr~pr~rcimion ot' currency A in terms of currency B re.ctor~ portfolio-
balance hy luwering the risk premium un guvernment Ixmds denominated in currency B, and by
increasing the velue of government hunds denominatcxl in currency B in terms of currency A.
Much attention has been paid to the effectiveness of interventions via the portfolio balance
channel bet;ause this channel, if operative, constitutes a tool of exchange rate policy independent
uf monetary policy. Empirical studies surveyed in Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) in general4
dv nvt find a systematic etfect of sterilized intervention via the portfolio balance channel. Data
limitations and theuretical and econometric problems have made it impossible to estimate the
portfolio balance model and measure the effects of sterilized intervention satisfactorily. As was
argued the pvrtfolio balance channel can only be effective if the risk premium (Rp ) in equation
(3) doe.c nut eyual zeru. Pruhlems arise however when one wants to calculate the risk premium.
Various attempts have heen made using different kinds of expectations formations (see, on the
problem uf e,etimating econometrically the portfolio-balance model, Tryon (1984) and Weber
(1986)). Furthermore, the enormous growth in financial market turnovers during the last decade is
likely to have diminished the potential for central banks to cause a significant imbalance in wealth
holders' pvrtfolios. For this reasvn current research focusses more on the expectations channel.
Expectations channel
Besides the portfolio-balance channel, two other channels are distinguished by which
sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate. The market-efficiency channel implies that the
central bank can "~focus~ theáttention of the public on neglected information that is germane to
exchange rate determination" (Lovpesku (1984, p. 258)j. It must be noted that in our opinion it is
very hard for the central bankers to establish the market inefficiencies with certainty. The
superior-information channel cvrresponds with what we call the expectations channel. By
prvviding the market with new information or a signal about the future course of the exchange
rate ur of monetary policy, the exchange rate can be expected to change immediately after the
interventivn. Nvtably, supporters of the asset mazket view of exchange rates see this as the main
channel through which interventions can affect the exchange rate. The basic relativnship which
underlies their analysis looks as follows:
S, - Z, t h E,~S„~ (4)
where the exchange rate is determined by relevant exogenous variables captured by the vectorz~
and by the expected hrture change in the exchange rate. The parameter b reflects the sensitivity of
the current exchange rate to expe,aed exchange rate changes. Under rational expectations, the
fvrward solution hwks as follows:
S,' ~ E (h)'E,Z.; 1 tb ;.0 1 tb
(5)
In some empirical studie,c, otticial exchange market operations which have a bearing on the
current or the expected future values ot' une of the 'fundamentals' captured by the vector Z~, i.e.
interventivns which create expectations of changes in monetary pvlicy or which embody another
sutficient "news"-content, appear to have a chance of affecting the exchange rate significantly.'
'See, e.g. Humpage (1988j, Dominguez (1990) and Eijttinger and Gruijters (1992).5
Klein and Rosengren (1991) use newspaper reports un dollaz intervention by the United States and
Germany. They tind that unly joint intervention after the Plaza Accord of September 22, 1985 was
perceivixl as e signal hy the market. Moreuver, acwrding to Klein and Rosengren's study
interventions did nut precede changes in monetary pulicy and periods of active intervention were
not tidlowed hy munetary pulicy changes.
On the whule, the results are rather mixed indicating perhaps that whether or not market
particip:mts pay attcntiun tu the interventiuns alsu dr.pends on the availahility uf uther 'news'.
Furthermure, statements by politicians and monetary authorities which accompany the intervention
can lend suppurt to ur detrect from its ettectiveness.
A general complication when verifying the effectiveness of intervention operations
empirically lies in the fact that the effect of central bank interventions is absorbed in the
muvements of the exchange rate immediately. To get a clear view of the actual effectiveness one
should be able to cumpare Ihese movements with the fluctuations in the exchange rate that would
have occurred in the absence of intervention. Furthermore, it can be argued that the estimations
are rather partial as must of the time intervention will be accompanied by other measures of
munuary Ix,licy, lirc instanre interest rate pulicy (see, un the relalive imlwrtance uf interventiun
determining exchange rates during the period 1985-88, Obs[feld (1988)).
III. An olher vicw un cxchan};c rate determinalion and the role of intervention
The theuretical and empirícal inves[igations highlighted in the previous section all
:4tisum.xl, cither implicitly ur expliritly th:d the monuary and porttiilio balance miáel fur exchange
rate determinatiun provide a valid framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of foreign
exchange intervention. After surveying the empirical evidence on exchange rate models,
MacDunald and Taylor (1992, p. 24) conclude that "...the asset approach models have performed
well for some time periods, such as the interwar period, and, to some extent, for the first part of
the recent fluating experience (that is, 1973-1978); but they have pruvided largely inadequate
explanatiuns for the hehavior of the major exchange rates during the latter part of the float".
Disumtent with the performance of traditional structural exchange rate models in
explaining the actual behaviour of exchange rates has led many economists to adopt new research
strategies in expluring the field of exchange rate economics. Firstly, within a short time, an
extensive GARCH literature has developed whichs aims at explaining the statistical properties
derived from the hehaviour ot' exchange rates (for a survey, see Bollerslev er al. (1992)).
Secundly, many researchers took up the challenge to find a consistent model that can simultane-
ously account fur changes in foreign exchange risk and changes in observed risk premia (see
Kur.dijk (1989) and the literature cited there). Thirdly, in a recent article Flood (1991) carries out
a microstructural analysis ut' the tixeign exchange market. Traders' hehaviour and the effect of
vazious institutional arrangements for matching buyers and sellers of foreign exchange are
investigated. Sumu progress has ellready heen made with the implementatiun uf the noise trading
approach, which can he thought uf as following directly from microstructure theory.6
De Grauwr'.c (1989) near-ratinnaliry mnde!
By now, the crucial role of risk is well established among reseazchers of foreign exchange
markets. De Grauwe (1989) takes risk into account explicitly. In his integrated approach, noise
trading behaviour seems to follow directly and in a consistent way from trading strategies based
on fundamental economic analysis which are assumed to prevail in the familiar monetazy and
pcMfolio balance model fl~r the exchenge rate. De Grauwe argues that economic models providing
a reliable guide tiir tiirecasting the tuture exchange rate are lacking. Within a mean vaziance
framework he thus shows that it is not necessarily profitable to use all available fundamental
economic information. For instance, an individual exchange mazket participant may observe a gap
between the actual level of the exchange rate and the perceived fundamental equilibrium value. In
a highly uncertain economic environment, the expected gain from taking a forward position aimed
et expluiting this gap may nnt outweigh the risk involved. Therefore, it can be rational for
exchange market participants to implement technical analysis. De Grauwe presents a rule for the
formation of exchange rate expectations that consists of a backwazd-looking (the first part on the
right-hand side of (6)) and a tiirward-looking (the second part) component:
E,cS„~ - k (E c~eS,-~) t (l-k) (S'-S,) (6)
,w
The paremeter k which represents the weight given to each ot' the expectation rules is assumed to
be endogenuus. Gxchange market perticipants chuose tu let the hackward-looking component
duminate their expectations formatiun (high value of k) when the actual exchange rate is not too
far away from the eyuilibrium rate they have in mind (S'). This implies that they resort to
technical analysis. A higher weight is assigned to the forward-looking component (lower value of
k) only in case it is obvious that the actual exchange rate is at an unsustainable level. Foreign
exchange trading based on tundamental analysis becomes less risky leading to a larger expected
utility in a mean variance framework. By assuming that exchange market participants revert to
backward-Icwking technical analysis instead of forward-looking fundamental analysis in case of
extreme uncertainty, De Grauwés near rationality model can account for some stylized facts of
(real) exchange rates which are left unexplained by perfect foresight rational expectations models,
i.e. real exchange rates wandering away from fundamentals for long periods of time before being
pushed back tuwards eyuilihrium and the relative sluggishness of exchange rate movements as
compared to stock and commodity price movements.2
'In an attempt to a~certain the extent and manner by which chartism is used Allen and Taylor
(1989) cunducteJ a yuestiunnairo survey uf chief fureign exchange dealers in the l.ondon market.
They found, intrruiiu, thet "at the shortest horizons, intraday to one week, approximately 90~ of
reslxmdents use sume chartist input in tiirming their exchange rate expectations, with b09ó judging
charts tn be at least as impurtant as fundamentals. At longer forecast horizons, of one to three
munths ur six munths tu une year, the weight given to tundamentals increase.c..." (p. 50). Further-
more, in a recent study De Grauwe and Decupere (1992) cannot reject the hypothesis that
psychological barriers exist in the yen-U.S. dollar market. For the DM-U.S. dollar market the
re.eults are mixed.While the current global exchenge rate system otfers no credible anchor for exchange rate
expectatiuns, De Grauwe (1989) sees no role for (un)sterilized intervention to remedy persistent
Jeviations uf exchange rates from their perceived equilibrium values. In his view, even changes in
fundamcntals hrought ahuut hy monetary or tiscal pulicy will not help. Due tu the extreme
uncertainty as to the true model, market participants do not know how to interpret these changes.
De Grauwe argues that only a credible exchange rate commitment by the monetary authorities,
i.e. a commitment embudying a clear and stabilizing guide for exchange mazket participan[s'
expectatiuns, ~an facilitate an efficient functioning of the foreign exchange market compazable to
xtock anJ rommudity markcts.
~ deterrninisric chuos mrxle! by De Gruuwe u~ul Van.vanten (1991D)
De Grauwu and Vansanten (I990) investigatc to what extent unpredictable exchange rate
muvements not causeJ hy 'news' hitting the tiireign exchangu market can be ohtained from non-
linear deterministic models, i.e. nun-linear models that do not contain stochastic disturbances. The
cheus model-generated time series for the exchange rate in their paper fits the facts of observati-
on.' It shows the familiar unpredictable pattern around an equilibrium value with relative calm
periuds alternated by restless ones characteristic of actual exchange rate movements. Their partial
eyuilibrium model uf the exchange rate acknowledges that a significant portion of foreign
exchange market participants do not base their trading strategies on fundamental economic
analysis. These traders are assumed to have extrapolative expectations. De Grauwe and Vansanten
choose (-p in (6) to arrive at:
EnS„~ - k (S,-S,-,) t (1-k) (S'-S,) (7)
Not surprisingly, they tind that "... e higher weight given to chartists behaviour", i.e. a lower
veluo uf k in (7), "increases the likelihcwd that the system becomes less stable or even explosive"
(p. 26). The mudel is extended to include ofticial foreign exchange intervention. Two alternative
leaning against the wind rules are pustulated. According to one rule the stock of foreign exchange
is adjusted in response tu current exchange rate movements. The other rule states that this is done
in response to one-period laggul exchange rate movements. Simulation results indicate that the
furmer rule has a stabilizing efftct un the variability of the exchange rate around its equilibrium
value. The latter rule eppears to have a de.etabilizing effect. De Grauwe and Vansanten admit that
in the framework of the nun-linear model wnsidered, the intntduction of a central bank which
leans against the wind without delay is much the same as giving a higher weight to fundamental
analysis. Thus, in their study taking account of chartist behaviuur does nut open up a distinct
'It should be nuted that the high sensitivity uf chaos model-generated tíme series to the starting
values chosen is well estahlished.8
channel through which tiireign exchange intervention can affect exchange rates.
Chartist channel anc! noisr trading .rigna[ingchannel ojintervention
Hung (1991a) contends that the presence of non-fundamentalist tnarket participants whose
trading behaviour is more or less predictable constitutes a channel through which sterilized
intervention can he eftèctive. Hung (1991b) presents empirical evidence in support of this
cuntentiun. Hung's approach is slightly different from that of De Grauwe (1989). The noise
treding behaviour by exchange market participants is not derived formally. Earlier work on noise
trading is just put to the right use. As De Grauwe, Hung arrives at the important insight that
fundamentalists can (at times) turn into noise traders due to the extreme uncertainty regarding the
future path of the exchange rate. She distinguishes two categories of non-fundamentalist or noise
U'adC1:C. CIIarIÍSlti aro :~ssum~tl a~ '...rcly on analysis uf' pa.ct price patterm to predict the future
direc;tion of exchange rate movements' (p. l2). Mazket participants who base trading on their
predictiun uf the market's reaction to news and rumors are called non-chartist noise traders. As in
De Grauwe and Vansanten (1990), the analysis is conducted in the framework of a partial
eyuilibrium tlow market approach to exchange rate determination. This seems reasonable while
the foreign exchange market is a continuous market, i.e. a mazket on which transaction orders aze
processed as they arrive. If a large enough group of noise traders use the same forecasting
techniyue or share the same belief with respect to the future course of the exchange rate,
expectations mey turn out to he self-fultilling. The central hank may want to counter the resulting
exchange rate movements. Hung argues that the noise trading behaviour displayed by market
participants in itself offers an opportunity for the central bank to do this successfully.
A necessary but, of course, not sutficient condition for intervention to be effective is that
the central bank can imagine itself in the position of the two groups of noise traders distinguished.
Curcent intervention volumes are insufficient to counter a strong underlying trend in the exchange
rate. Therefore, the decision concerning timing, technique and volume of intervention has to be
made conditional on information about the general market sentiment and the (strength of the) buy
ur sell signals adherents of technical analysis derive from their charts. Hung (1991a, p. 20)
presents en ideal picture in which chartists '... help amplify and prolong the effect of intervention'
which may he transitory hy itself. The central bank should select a time period during which the
market is xufticicntly thin. CunccaleJ intervention carricxl uut thruugh hrokers may cause just
enough upward or duwnward pressure on the currency under consideration which, if incorporated
in the chutists' trendline analysis induces them to reinforce the movement of the exchange rate in
the direction favoured by the central bank. This is what Hung calls the chartist channel of
intervention. When the interventions indeed remain anonymous, the central bank has nothing to
loose in ternu of reputation. The latter condition may account for the fact that detailed interventi-
on data are not made publicly available. On the other hand, Hung (1991b, p.~) admits that "...
chart analysis has a large suhjective element, and there are probably as many methods of9
combining and interproting the various techniyues as there are chartists themselves". A second
channel is the noise trading signaling channel. For this channel, the opportunity to influence the
wurse of the exchange rate does not lie in the thinness of the market or the fact that traders only
stare. at their charts. Fur the noise trading signaling channel to be effective, noise traders must be
"...already louking fur any sign ur excuse to reverse their pusition" (Hung (1991b, p. 12)j.
Highly visihle interwntiuns, wnduct~l through [he interhank market could give just such a signal.
IV. Intervention by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve in the DMIS-market
In this section we report on the results of an empirical investigation into the effectiveness
of daily foreign exchange market intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve System in the DMIá-market. From the previous section it has become cleaz that the
effectivene,cs of sterilized intervention via the expectations channel and the noise trading channel,
if uperative, depends crucially upun market cunditions and the timing and technique of interventi-
un strategies. These factors can nut be taken into account by our study explicitly. Therefore, we
actually test the joint hypothesis that intervention had a systematical effect on the course of the
DMIS-rate and that the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve only intervened when the circumstan-
ces were favourable to attain their exchange rate objective in the short run.
The daily data on interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve in the DMIS-
exchange market over the period February 1987 to October 1989 show that interventions were
wncentrated in specitic months and thus that periods ot' intervention were alternated by (someti-
mes longer) periods of non-intervention. Moreover, the interventions in these relatively short
periuds were one-sided (either purchases or sales). Thus it may be concluded that neither the
Bunde,ebank (althuugh intervening muro freyuently and in larger amounts), nur the Federal
Reserve interveneil only to smooth exchange rate movements, but also tried to intluence the
exchange rate (or market sentiment) in a specitic direction towards an equilibrium value (which
eventually was implied by the February 1987 Louvre Agreement of the G-7 countries).
ln section II it was discussed that, if operative, the portfolio balance channel of interventi-
on derives its effect from creating an imbalance in the wealth holders' portfolios. Accordingly, in-
terventiuns will have a pruportionate etfect on the exchange rate which is constant over time. By
contrast, in the case of the expectations channel much depends on the strength of the mazket
sentiment. Consequently, the effect of intervention working via this channel is expected to vary
over time. Therefore, as relevant subsamples have been selected four periods of at least three
months with prolunged interventions in one direction by either of the central banks.
The first period runs from September 1987 to January 1988. It seems that during this
period, the G-3 countríes were no longer willing to direct monetary policy at stabilizing exchange
rates as was agreed upun at the Louvre meeting. Furthermore, the October 1987 stock market
crash is likely to have caught exchange market participants off balance, calling for dollazlo
suptxirting interventiun.
In the tirst half of 1988, the U.S. dollar recovered gradually from its steep decline in the
aftermath of the stock market crash. The dullar's upward movement against the mark strengthened
vigorously during the seamd period considered in this paper, Iune 1988 through September 1988.
It eppeared tu he possible fiir the U.S. economy to experience a relatively strong growth without
1'rustrating external adjustment. The announcement of U.S. trade deficits which were much smaller
than expectecl mede exchange market participants to anticipate a further appreciation of the
dullar.' Coordinated central bank interventions in August 1988 [o counteract this rise was
suplxttted by the Bundeshank's move, un August 25, to raise its discount rate by 'h percentage
point leading to a narrowing of the interest differential in favor of the dollar.
The third periexi runs from Dec:ember 1988 to lune ]989. Political strains in Germany and
Japan on the une hand, and a widening shurt-term interest differential favoring the U.S. dollar
uver ihe deutsche mark un the uther hand put the value of the dollar under upward pressure.
Thereby, the market temlxirarily uverlcxiked the structural weakness uf the U.S. dollaz caused by
the persistent U.S. 'twin deticit'. The huoyancy uf the dollar and thus the perceived need for
(U.S.) interventiun tinally subsided in late June 1989. Indications of a deceleration of economic
growth and a lessening of intlationary pressure led to market expectations of an easier U.S.
monetary policy stance and lower short-term interest rates.
As fourth period is chusen August 1989-October 1989. During this period, again, the
dollar came under upward pressure. The currency was strengthened by lower than expected U.S.
trade deticits for lune and July released on August 17 and September 15, respectively, and
favurable employment and retail sales data lowering the probability, as perceived by mazket
participants, uf an rasing of U.S. monetary pcilicy. By means of ufticial sales of dollars, in part
undertaken atter a G-7 meeting un September 23, the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve tried to
convince market participants thet the G-7 monetary authorities were firmly committed to resisting
the dullar's rise and maintaining exchange rate stability.
Interventiuns and the Ievel of the DMIá-rate.
Under the assumptiun of highly etticient markets, effective interventions will influence the
exchange rate movement immecliately (that is, within the same day) hy altering the expectations of
market participants. l'hus, the intraJay change uf the UMIS-exchanga rate can be written as a
timcti~~n uf, intrr uliu. U.S. dollar interventiuns of the Deutsche Bundeshank expressed in
deutsche marks against the DMldullar-interventiun rate uf that Jay (l~ry'"4i) and DM-interventi-
'Empirical evidence on the relation between trade balance announcements and exchange rate
movements is presented in, e.g., Hogan et al. (1991), Klein et al. (1991), and Eijffinger and
Gruijters (1992).II
ons of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the Federal Reserve System,
so far as these operetions affect the net foreign position of the Bundesbank (fAty~}':
S,r~ - S,r~ - f In(i uM-i ~')~ , INV,une, INV,.soJ (8)
7~e exchange merket interventions hy the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve are both
expressed in hillions ot DMs. The interventions are positive if the central bank buys dollazs in
return tirr DMs. The opening rate (S~') and the closing rate (s~) are both defined as the spot
value of one dollar expressed in DM at the Frankfurt exchange. They are collected at 8.30 hours
and 16.30 hours (Frankfurt time), respectively. e(i~-t~r denotes the change in the short-term
interest differontial between EuroDM- and Eurodollar deposits in London during day r. It is a
wmmon essumption that intraday exchange rate movements are caused primarily by short term
capitel flows. Supposing that investors balance their porttblios at every moment, a change in the
interest rate differential will lead w imbalances and thus immediately induce an adjustment process
in the highly efticient money and foreign exchange markets. A relative rise in the DM interest cate
will bring ahuut a demand surplus for DM a,csets. Given the supply of DM a.csets in the short run,
purtlidiu eyuilibrium will hu restur~d by a fall in the exchange rate. Unlirrtunately, intradaily
interest rate data matching the opening and closing uf the Frankfurt exchange were not available."
Theretirre, the estimated equation looks as follows:
S,r~ - S,r - u,~ t u~ INV,r~ i u, INV,~r~ t W~ (9)
where p~ is a residual. It is a restricted form of equation (8) in the sense that the focus is on
interventions reversing unwanted exchange rate movements. Consequently, official exchange
market operations which slow down the latter movements aze not identified as successful
`By choosing the deutsche mark-U.S. dollar opening and closing rates in Frankfurt, a 24-hour
day can be divided in twu segments: the European segment (the day) and the non-European
segment (the night). We assume that Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions in the DMIS-
market take place during the Europaan segment of the day. Goodhart and Hesse (1991) analyse
Reuters screen information during the 12-week period from 10~4189 until 2916189 which falls
within the sample used in this study. According to the news updates appearing on Reuters screen,
the Bundeshank reportedly intervened I I times during this period: 2 times just after the opening
uf the Frankfurt market at 8.30 hours (Frankfurt time), 5 times at the fixing (13.00 hours,
Frankfurt time) and 4 times in the afternoon segment of the Frankfurt market.
"fstima[iun residts in Guudhart (1988) indicate that omitting from e;yualiun (7) the variable
capturing the change in the short-term interest differential will not detract from its relevance.
Gaxlhart amcludes thet interest rate changes, which he assumes to be mainly unanticipated,
"explain effectively none of the exchange rate tluctuations" ~Goudhart (1988, p.441)). The same
result emerges frum empirical investigations in Eijftinger and Gruijters (1992).lz
interventions. Of wurse, this touches upon the familiar methodological problem that we aze
ignorant of the tluctuations in the exchange rate [hat would have occurred in the absence of
intervention. If the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are able to influence the mazket
sentiment, the exchange rate will rise after the news of dollaz-purchases by the central banks.
Therofore, in that case the intervention coefficients (a~,~) will be positive.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results for equation (9) are reported in Table
I. The constant (QO) is significantly positive in the second subsample reflecting the appreciation of
the U.S. dullar vis-d-vis the deutsche mark. More surprisingly, for the first sample it is positive
tuo althuugh nut signiticant at usual contidence levels. Probahly, the major part of the overall
dollar-depreciation in the months after the stockmarket crash took place during the non-European
segment of the DMIS-exchange market (that is, while the Frankfurt exchange was closed). More
importantly, the estimation results in Table 1 indicate that the interventions conducted by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve on the whole did not systematically affect the level of the
DMIS-rate across the fuur subsamples. Only the coefficient for Federal Reserve intervention (~)
in the se~und sample is correctly signed and significant at a 1096-level in a two-tailed test. It
implics that during th~ lhirJ yuarter ut 1988 a salc uf U.S. Jullars wurth DM 100 milliun un
average Ied to a luwering uf the DM15-rate by 5 pfennig. Furthermore, the Bundesbank interven-
Table I Butuleshank und Federu! Reserve interventions and the leve! of the DMIá-rate;
~L~ eJ'tilrlat(oR rPSU~L~
100 (log S," - lug S,~) - a~ t a~ INV,r~ t a21NVr~'
period ao al a2 RZ DW Obs.
9:87-1:88 O.OG7 -0.001 0.00059 0.03 1.93 105
(1.25) (-2.28) (1.19)
G:88-9:88 0.117 -0.OOOII 0.00051 0.02 2.03 86
(1.98) (-0.47) (1.78)
12:88-G:89 0.045 0.00032 0.000064 -.003 1.76 145
(1.19) (1.14) (0.41)




g Z is the syuared multiple currelatiun coetticient adjusted for degrees of freedom.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for tirst-order autocorrelation.
Obs. gives the number of observations for each period.13
tion coeftïcient (a~ ) in the tiwrth periud is statistically significant at a 1096-level in a one-tailed
test.
We also carrieJ uut an event study of the effectiveness of daily Bundesbank and Federal
Reserve interventions. Under the assumption that the opening spot rate (S~~) incorporates all
inturmation availahle at the time uf collection and that interventions are unpredictable, the event
study takes the furm of estimating equation (8) for each central bank separately with the zeto-
interventiun observations left uut of the samples. For example, the following result was found for
Bundesbank intervention during the fourth period, trom August 1989 to October 1989:
s~- s~- 0.422 t 0.00235 ~N~~ou
(2.42) (2.41)
R 2- 0.2430 DW- I.556 Obs. - 16
As betiire, t-statistics are in parentheses. During the period considered Bundesbank interventions
were acwmpanicxl by and, perhaps, even caused a major shift of the market sentiment in favor of
u stronger deutsche mark. A similar regression on all non-zero intervention observations over the
whule sample periixl, from September 1987 to October 1989, does not obtain a axrectly signed
and signiticant interventiun ~uefticient liir either uf the central banks. This cunfirms that much
depends on the strength uf the market sentiment and the ability of central bankers to 'read' it.
Interventions and the volatility of the DMIS-rate.
At the beginning of this section four periods were selected during which the Bundesbank
and the Fcxlerel Re.tierve System tried tu prevent the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar in terms of
deutsche marks frum muving out of line with the equilibrium rate agreed upon at the Louvre. The
exposition in section II suggests that in the presence of non-fundamentalist exchange mazket
participants interventions can he etlective by inereasing volatility and thus by restoring two-sided
risk in a one-sided market. Estimation results in Almekinders and Eijffinger (1992) indicate that
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve do monitor volatility in the DMIS-market. An increase in
the conditional variance appears to have led the central banks to increase the volume of interventi-
on, both in case of dollar-sales and purchases on account of their "leaning against the wind"
pulicy. Here, we want tu investigate whether Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions
contrihuted systematically to unexpected increases in volatility. Actual volatility is proxied by the
square of [he mure-than-average (intra~aily return. Expected volatility is proxied by the GARCH-
mtntel-impli~l wnditiunel varience ut' (intraklaily returns.
The average or unconditional variance of a time series is constant by definition. The
wnditional variance can vary over time. The evolution over time of the vaziance or standard
deviation of exchange rate changes and other statistical properties derived from the behavior ofla
exchange rates have recently become a subject of intensive research. Several recent studies have
applied Engle's (I982) auwregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) model and Bollers-
lev's (1986) extension to a generalized ARCH (GARCH) model to describe time-varying vaziances
in exchange rates. The purport of the meanwhile extensive GARCH literature, aptly surveyed in
Bollerslev et al. (1992), is that volatility in daily returns is predíctable in most financial markets.
In several applications it has been shown that there is a long term persistence in the effects of
shocks in period r onto the conditional variance of exchange rates in period r.s for large s.
An insighttul specification of the conditional variance equation which is often used in the
literature looks as tbllows:
h,'Q'~~E~'(E;-,-~-Q~) (10)
An uutstanding fwturo ut eyuatiun (10) is that the cunditiunal variance (ti~) is higher than the
unconditional variance (az) if the weigted average of past forecasting ercors (E~) with geometrical-
ly de~aining weights (Q~ ) is large. Therefore, it is not surprising that this specification of the
variance eyuatiun is generally found to be able to aecuunt for the clustering of outliers in
exchange rate returns seen in practice.
Estimation results in Almekinders (1992) point to a marked change in the stochastic
process generating the DM~S-return series after the establishment of the Louvre Agreement of
February 22, 1987. Furthermore, it appeared that the process remained relatively stable at least
until October 1989. Therefore, the sample period used to estimate the GARCH model runs from
Fehruary 23, 1987 thruugh tu October 31, 1989 totalling 677 observation,c. Maximum likelihood
estimatiun results fur two GARCH models are shuwn in Table 2. The models differ in the
speciticatiun of the mean eyuation. In essence, equation (l la) is a random walk model for the
DMIS-return during a glubal, 24-hour trading day. This includes the European segment of the
exchange market un day r during which the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are assumed to
intervene, and the nun-European segment uf the market on day r-t immediately preceding day
r's Eurupean segment. Equation (I la') characterizes the stochastic proce.cs generating the DMIá-
return seríes for the European segment uf the exchange market only. Eo and E~ are the residuals
uf the daily anJ intradeily randum walk mcHlel. respectively: eyuation (1 Ib) state.c thet they have a
conditiunal normal Jistributiun with mean zero and variance hD1 p c indicates the information
available tu exchange market participants as uf the beginning of the relevant interval for which the
DM~S-return is calculated, i.e. the clusing of the FrankfuR foreign exchange on day t-t and day
r's opening, respectively. Equation (Ilc) detines the variance equation (hD~). It can be obtained
hy rearranging equation (10). The constant in the mean equations (bo) does not differ significantly
from zeru. Obviously, the DMIá-rate díd nut increase unitbrmly across the sample. The constant
~Insert Tahle 2 here~IS
in the variance eyuation (A) is nut signiticant in the second model. The other coefficients in both
GARCH models are highly signiticant. The value of the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in the
Iast column uf Table 2 indicates that the null hypothesis Ho: ~-8-0 can be soundly rejected for
twth GARCH mudels.' This implies thet the random walk mudel with a GARCH error term fits
the data better than the random walk model with a Gaussian error term. For both specifications of
the mean eyuation the kurtosis (mi) is larger than that coming from a standazd normal distribution
alheit less than in the ca.ee of the simple random walk model with m4 - 4.62 and 7.44 for both
mean eyuations, respectively." On the whole, it can be azgued that the conditional ttormal
specification captures the stylized facts of the DMIE-exchange rate fairly well.
The GARCH model with mean equation (i la), for which the estimation results are
depictecl in the tirst line of Table 2, can take account of the persistence in the effects of shocks in
periud r onto the wnditiunal variance in later pariods appropriately. However, the DMlS-return is
celwlated from Jay r-t's clusing uf the Frankfurt exchange onwards. lnterventions on day r are
~arricxl out in the European segment after the Frankfurt exchange is upened again, i.e. during the
lut 8 hours of the 24-huur periud for which the DMIá-return is calculated. Therefore, in
rogressiuns tu he discussed helow, ofticial exchenge market operations are most likely found to
have rractedto earlier exchange rate developments, and not to have cuused them. In the GARCH
mudel with mean equation (I la'), the period for which the DMIS-return is calculated matches the
periud during which the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are assumed to intervene. However,
the GARCH model with this second mean equation is less satisfactorily from the point of view of
the mudel's ahility to capture the persistence of the effect of shocks on the conditional vaziance of
exchange rate returns. Ohviously, when a particular period is limited to the European segment of
the 24-huur exchange rate trading day, period r.t does not start immediately after period r.
Thus, in the GARCH model fur intradaily exchange rate returns shocks occuring during the non-
European segment of the trading day can not have a beazing on the conditional variance in the
European segment coming up next. The lower value of the likelihood ratio test statistic in the last
culumn uf Tahle 2 refluts the less satisfactorily specification of this GARCH model. For this
reatiun, we did not contine ourselves to the estimations with synchronous data, i.e. in[ervention
data und exchange rate data limited tn the European segment of day r only. The estimation results
depictul in Tahle 2 are used tu generate tíme series tiir the conditional variance of the daily (hD)
and intra-daily DMIá-return (h~). Fur each return series, the unconditional or average vaziance
titt the sample cumidered in Tahle 2, a' - x!(I-a-O), is used es a starting value.
'fhe clearly luwer value uf the lest statistic tiir the GARCH mudel with intradaily data (mean
eyuatiun (I la')) retlects its less straightforward speciticatiun mentioned above.
'Standard normal distributions have a kurtosis equal to three. Distributions with a kurtosis
larger than three are leptokurtic in that they have more observations in the tails, away from the
mean, when tompared with a nurmal dis[ribution.16
Betiire turning to the effectiveness study, it is appropriate to check the unbiasedness of the
GARCH model-implied forecasts. To test whether the volatility forecasts systematically deviate
from the actual volatility tigures, we regressed the latter vaziable on the former:
~ 100 ~(.~~,~ - s,",) - hol'- - 0.091 t 0.791 h~o
(1.10) (4.25)
R 2- 0.0246 DW - 2.084 Obs. - 677 F(0, I)- 0.6412
~ 100 -( s,~ - s,") - boJ' - 0.046 f 0.691 k~~
(0.4b) (1.29)
R 2- 0.001 DW - 2.067 Obs. - 677 F(0,1) - 0.3925
(12)
(12')
where t-sl:~tistics eru in parenthescs. In hoth c;i.ties, the constant term is not significantly differen[
frum zero. In eyuation (12) the slupe term is nut signiticantly dift~erent from unity at standard
levels of signiticance. The slope term in equation (12') does not differ significantly from unity nor
from zero. The joint null hypothesis of a constant equal to zero and a slope term equal to unity is
not rojected in an F-test (relevant critical value for a 596-level test: 3.90). These statistics lend
support to the view that the GARCH model-implied forec:asts of (intraklaily exchange rate
volatility are unbiased.
Table 3 presents the results uf regressing unexpected volatility in the DMIS-rate on a
constant term and otticial dollar purchases by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. The
regressions tiir the unexpected volatility during the European segment arul the preceding non-
European segment of the market (a 24-hour period) have the best statistical fit. However,
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions are mostly carriecl out during the European
segment (see footnote 6). Consequently, the volatility surprises lead the interventions and we have
to conclude that the intervention coefticients (~l,~i) in Table 3a derive their statistical significance
from 'reversed causatiun'. The e.etimation results indicate that both central hanks buy (more) U.S.
dullars (during the F.urupean segmem uf day t) when taced with unanticipated volatility, which
prohably originated in the non-European segment of day r-t, in a downward market and sell
(more) when the value uf the dollar is moving upwards beyond the Louvre-equilibrium value. The
positive wetticient for Federal Raserve intervention in the second row of Table 3a defies
explanation.
The exchange rate and intervention data used in the regressions shown in Table 3b are
more or less synchronous. Hence, 'reversed causation' is less likely to be a problem. In the first
period, dollar purehases by the Fecleral Reserve seem to have caused some additional volatility. In
~Insert Tahle 3 here~17
the fourth period, dollar sales by the Bundesbank are likely to have contributed to a restoration of
twu-sided risk in a bullish market.
V. Conclusions
The empirical investigations in this study have been going beyond the verification of the
effectiveness ot' foreign exchange intervention via the conventional channels of influence. Daily
intervention data were available. This made it possible to test whether interventions by the
Deutsche Bund~hank end the Federal Reserve System affected the level and volatility of the
DMIS-rate via the chartist channel andlor via the noise trading signalling channel. In accordance
with these channels, the effect of intervention on the level of the DMIS-rate is found to have
varied over time, depending on the ever-changing market sentiment and the ability of central
bankers to 'read' it.
Hung ( 1991a,b) suggests that in the presence of non-fundamentalist exchange mazket
participaMs interventions cen he effective by increa.eing volatility and thus by restoring two-sided
risk in a one-sided market. Estimation results in Almekinders and Eijffinger (1992) indicate that
the Bundeshank and the Federal Reserve do monitor volatility in the DMIa-market. This study
tcsts whcth.~r Bundcshank :mJ 1-cdcrel Reserve interventiuns contrihut~l systematically to
unrxpectecl increases in vulatility. Actual volatility is proxied by the square of the more-than-
avrrag~ (intra)Jaily return. Expectcxl volatility is proxiaxl hy the GARCH-mcxlel-implied
conditiunal variance uf (intra)daily returns. To generate the time series for the wnditional vaziance
of the (intra)daily DMIá-returns twu GARCH models are estimated in this study. One GARCH
mudel describes DMlS-returns over a 24-hour period which includes the European segment of the
exchange market un day t during which the Bundeshank and the Federal Reserve are assumed w
intervene, und the non-Eurupean segment of the market on day r-t immediately preceding day
r's European szgment. Estimation results for this model contirm recent evidence that the GARCH
model gives a guud description of the statistical properties of daily exchange rate returns on the
U.S. dullar-deutschu mark market. With the wnditiunal veriance mcxleled as a weighted average
uf the variance in past Jays with gettmetrically declining weight,c, the GARCH model can capture
thc stylircd tact uf cluxtci:ti ~il' largc DMIa-returns. "I'hc zccund CiARC'H mudcl charactcrizex the
stuchastic proces gencratiug thc UMIS-rcturn serics ti~r the kiuropcan scgment uf the exchange
market only. This m~xlel is le.es satisfactorily when judged at its ability to cepture the persistence
of the effect of shocks on the conditional variance of exchange rate returns. However, the period
fur which the DMIS-return is calculated matches the pericxi during which the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve are assumed to intervene. Hence, the time series for the conditional vaziance
derived frum the secund GARCH model facilitates the proper testing of interventions leading
unexpected volatility through the chartist and noise trading signalling charmel. For two out of four
puitxts we tind that interventions by either of the central banks were associated with unexpected
intradaily DMIS-volatility.IH
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Table 2 Muximum likrlihood esrimation resulrs for tx,o GARCH models
100(IugS,"-IogS~"~) -b„se~ (lla)
100 ( log S,~ - log S~~) - b~~ a E~ (Ila')
Eu.~ I~ ~ ly(p, h~,.r) (Ilb)
ho.i - ,~ ~ a (EO.~), ~ ~ hu.i (11C)
mean
equation ba x a n IogL Q(12) Q'(12) m~ m, LR(2)
(Ila) 0.015 0.02I 0.074 0.875 .649.25 10.28 20.58 0.04 4.29 36.54
(0.67) (2.75) (4.49) (32.26)
(Ilá) 0.022 0.01 0.025 0.92 -363.37 7.85 18.27 0.48 6.69 7.93
(1.32) (1.30) ( 1.89) (17.14)
Nores:
t-statistics in parenthe..es.
m, anJ m, give the sample skewness and kurtosis for the residuals respectively.
Q(12) and Q2(12) refer to the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for up to l2'th order serial correlation in the
levels and the syuares uf the residuals rwspectively. The critical value for a 596-level test is 21.0.
LR(2) gives the value of the test statistiC for the likelihood ratio test under the nullhypothesis that the
variance is Cuntlitiunal humoskulastit H,,: a-0,1i-0. As the alternative hypothesis is H,: az0, 8z0; the
LR-statistic doe.s nut have a X~-distrihution with two degrees of freexlom. The tabulated critical value for
a 596-level test is 5.135 (Kodde and Palm (1986)).22
Table 3 BuiuJesbank and Federa! Reserrr internntions and the volatillty of the DMIS-rate;
OLS ra~timation results
3a J~ 1W~(~ u ~~ni) - b~J- - h"} - c~ a Ci INV~~ ~ C', INVtr~~
perial c~ c~ cl R Z DW Obs.
9:87-1:88 -0.098 0.0026 0.0011 O.IO 2.12 105
(-0.82) (2.49) (I.01)
6:88-9:88 -0.039 -0.0008 0.0009 0.06 2.01 86
(-0.46) (-2.48) (2.1G)
12:88~i:89 -0.I32 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.10 2.44 145
(-1.82) (-1.76) (-3.68)
8:89-10:89 0.024 -0.0003 -0.0007 -.02 1.97 66
(0.14) (-0.18) (-0.63)
3b {J100 ~( s,U - S,~) - b~J- - h,'} - co t c~ INV,~ ~ cz INV,~
pcri~Kl c~ c~ c2 R Z DW Obs.
9:87-1:88 0.038 -0.0008 O.OOl4 0.007 2.03 105
(0.42) (-1.02) (I.GS)
G:88~1:88 O.UW3 -O.UOW35 -0.00(K17 -A23 2.28 86
(0.01) (-0.2I) (-0.33)
12:88-G:89 -0.OIG 0.000056 0.00004 -.013 2.14 145
(-0.53) (0.26) (0.32)
8:89-10:89 0.021 -0.OOII 0.00019 0.011 2.17 6G
(0.33) (-1.64) (0.44)
notrs:
see Table IDiscussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg Univenlty, T6e NetLertanda:
(For previous papers please wnsult previous discussion papers.)
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